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No one in the Western intellectual tradition 
can ask the question posed in my title without 
reference to Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus. In that 
work Plato tried to sort out how we could tell those 
beliefs which are mere opinions from ones which 
we are entitled to be certain of. It was only those 
beliefs, the ones of which we could be certain, that 
he thought deserved to be called “knowledge.” And 
notice that what he was after was certainty what 
we’re entitled to. So it’s not just a matter of our 
feeling certain; the guy who feels lucky may believe 
he’s going to win the lottery today, but that won’t 
entitle him to be certain of it. (As a matter of fact, 
if you look at the statistics, it’s probably close to 
certainly not true.)  So Plato’s question was “how 
do we tell genuine certainty from mere opinion?”  
As we think about this question and the answers 
that have been given to it, it might be good to keep 
in mind some things that are naturally taken by 
everyone to be certainly true. For example, no 
doubt you are all sure of your name, address, and 
telephone number. But Plato and the mainstream 
Western intellectual tradition following him 
say you’re wrong!  Amazingly, that tradition has 
concluded that not only beliefs such as your name, 
address, and telephone number, but also your 
belief that this session is now in progress—and 
that there is a seat under your butt—are all things 
you can’t know for sure!  
Where that tradition came out on this question 
can be summarized this way: you’re entitled 
(justified, warranted) in being certain of a belief 
if and only if it is either self-evident or proven. 
Now you might be sitting there thinking “Well, 
so what? It’s self-evident to me that my name, 
address, telephone number are what they are.” But 
the Western intellectual tradition is not through. 
For  although it has spent centuries debating the 
topic of what counts as a proof, it has rarely ever re-
examined self-evidency for the simple reason that 
it was taken care of once and for all and by one of 
the biggest names in philosophy ever, Aristotle.
In considering self-evident knowledge, 
Aristotle reviews several possible objections against 
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there being self-evident truth, and he argues 
that every one of the objections fails. He then 
concludes by saying, “So there is self-evident truth 
and whatever is known in this way is a necessary 
truth and cannot be false.” Keep in mind that a 
necessary truth is a law (or a belief entailed by a 
law). So he’s restricting self-evident truth to law-
beliefs alone. Moreover, he then adds that if you 
know a law self-evidently, you’re infallibly right. 
So he ends with two restrictions on the experience 
of seeing a belief to be self-evidently true: it can 
properly attach only to a law, and the resulting 
belief must be one which cannot possibly be false. 
Perhaps you can now see why he denied that your 
beliefs about your name, address, and telephone 
number, that there is a chair under your butt, and 
that this session is in now in progress, can be self-
evident beliefs. And, of course, it’s not just those 
beliefs that are ruled out; so is the belief that God 
exists.  
There is still more to the Western tradition 
about self-evident truth, however. In the 1600s, 
two more very influential thinkers, Descartes and 
Locke, added yet another restriction to genuinely 
self-evident belief. They said that a self-evident 
belief is one which, when understood by any 
normal person, is seen by that person to be self-
evidently true. So I call their added restriction the 
“everybody requirement.” (In fact, this additional 
requirement acquired such widespread acceptance 
that it came to be regarded as the definition of a self-
evident truth.) This means, of course, that if any 
normal, adult human being doesn’t see a particular 
belief to be self evidently true, then it is not. So 
this restriction, too, rules out your name, address, 
and telephone number, that this session is now in 
progress, and that God exists.  And it is because of 
this  restriction that people for centuries have been 
asking Christians for their proof of God’s existence. 
They have said, in effect, “You claim to know God 
exists, but it’s obviously not self-evident. So where is 
your proof?”  And, unfortunately, many Christians 
have taken that bait and tried to construct proofs. 
Now while I think it can be shown that not a single 
one of those proofs succeeds, that isn’t why I called 
those attempts unfortunate. I said “unfortunately” 
because I think there are good reasons to say that 
whatever could be proven would thereby not be God. 
Let me explain.
God as revealed in Scripture is the creator of 
everything in the cosmos, “seen or unseen.” So 
that includes the laws we use to prove beliefs or 
theories. For that reason, trying to construct a 
proof of God’s existence inadvertently lowers God 
from being the creator of all laws to a being who is 
subjected to those laws. Here’s the same point put 
another way. Whatever can be proven using the 
laws of proof—whether mathematical or logical—
is not the creator of the laws of proof by whom they 
were brought into existence. So without realizing 
it, the thinkers who tried to prove God’s existence 
did him no favor. Instead, they unintentionally 
demoted him to what is in fact a creaturely level of 
existence. And this is why I say that whatever can 
be proven would thereby not be God.  
Now perhaps some of you are thinking that the 
answer to the question of how we know God is “by 
faith.”  Many people nowadays, when asked how 
they know God is real, are heard to say, “That’s 
part of my faith.” This answer has the merit of 
not falling into the trap of offering a proof, but I 
must say at once that I don’t think that’s right. It is 
not the way New Testament writers use the word 
God as revealed in 
Scripture is the creator of 
everything in the cosmos, 
“seen or unseen.” So 
that includes the laws we 
use to prove beliefs or 
theories. For that reason, 
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proof of God’s existence 
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“faith.” Instead, they use it to mean exactly what 
you and I mean by it in our every day discourse. 
We ordinarily mean trusting someone to keep a 
promise, and they mean trusting God to keep his 
promises. But since you’d already have to believe a 
person exists in order to trust that person, the trust 
can’t be that there is such a person. And that’s true 
whether that person is another human or God. 
Since this is an important point, let me cite briefly 
one place where the New Testament confirms it. 
At the beginning of Hebrews 11 we read, “Now 
faith is the basis for the things we hope for, the 
grounds on which we believe and the things not 
yet seen.” See my point?  Faith has to do with 
trusting God for the things he has promised us but 
which haven’t yet been realized, not God’s own 
reality. Further on, this same chapter adds this 
remark: “Without faith it’s impossible to please 
God because whoever would come to God, must 
believe that He exists...” —and here comes the 
faith part— “…and that He rewards those who 
seek Him.”  The faith part, once again, is that He 
will keep his promises by rewarding those who 
seek Him. In the New Testament the chief of those 
promises is our resurrection; the promise that just 
as Christ was raised from the dead, so too we will 
be raised from the dead and will live forever in His 
kingdom on this earth. That hasn’t happened yet, 
but meanwhile we trust God’s promises that he 
will bring it about. So I conclude that faith in God 
won’t answer the question of how we know God 
exists because we’d already have to believe he exists 
in order to trust Him. 
If you are tempted at this point to think that 
the entire subject of mere opinion versus justified 
certainty is foreign to the New Testament, and so 
should be off limits rather than taken seriously, 
then you need to know that its writers do at times 
make the distinction between mere belief and 
knowing for sure. There are places in the New 
Testament where its writers clearly do distinguish 
mere opinion from certitude (Luke 1.1, 10.11; 
John 6.69; Rom. 2.2; I Tim. 1.4; I Jn. 4.16). So 
it is significant that they, like the prophets before 
them, insist that we know God.  
So what are we to say about that claim? If 
we don’t believe God is real because it’s proven, 
it’s ruled out as self-evident, and it’s not a matter 
of faith, how then can it be knowledge? What I 
want to propose is that our knowledge of God’s 
reality is self-evident after all. I want to back that 
proposal with arguments to show that it’s the three 
restrictions on self-evidency that are in trouble, 
not belief in God.  
Let’s examine these restrictions further, taking 
them in reverse order.  
First, the “everybody requirement.”  Descartes 
and Locke want us to believe that unless everybody 
agrees that a belief is self-evident, it’s not. So I ask, 
Is the “everybody requirement” self-evident?  And 
the answer has to be “no” because it is not to me. So 
even if I’m the only person who doesn’t see it as self-
evident, the restriction fails its own requirement. 
Of course, it could still count as knowledge if it 
could be proven. So can it be proven?  The answer 
can only be that it’s impossible to prove because 
“everyone” has to include all the dead and the 
unborn. As hard as it would be to canvass the six 
billion people now living on earth, that’s nothing 
compared to canvassing the dead and the unborn. 
Therefore, the requirement that for a belief to be 
self-evidently certain everybody has to see it as so, 
is itself neither self-evident nor proven. Thus, it is 
not knowledge; it is merely somebody’s opinion. 
What about Aristotle’s requirement that self-
evidency attaches only to necessary truths?  Well, 
that’s not self-evident to me either, and no one’s 
ever even tried to prove it, so it fails the “everybody 
requirement.” But that’s not all. It also fails its own 
requirement because the requirement that a self-
evident belief be a necessary truth is not itself a 
necessary truth. It neither has a self-contradictory 
denial, nor is it entailed by a necessary truth. And 
the whole while that this restriction fails to acquit 
itself, we and everyone else in fact experience our 
normal perceptions of the world around us to 
be self-evidently true (like the chair being under 
our butt and the fact that this session is now in 
progress). 
Finally, let’s consider the requirement that 
to be self-evidently true a belief would have to 
be infallibly true. My first reaction is to say that 
infallibility belongs only to God, and for humans 
to desire it is an instance of sin. There is nothing 
about us that is infallible. Normal perception 
reliably gives us truth, but it is not infallible. 
Reasoning can also give us truth, but it is not 
infallible either. Just so, there is no reason to doubt 
that intuitions of self-evidency give us truth, but 
they do so without having to be infallible. There 
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is nothing about us that just can’t be wrong. But 
that doesn’t matter because we don’t need to be 
infallible in order to be certain. To see why this 
is so, take the example of normal perception. You 
and I know that our perceptual capabilities are not 
infallible; we know that we can be fooled and that 
there are such things as hallucinations and realistic 
dreams. But you are certain that you’re hearing (or 
reading) these words right now, aren’t you? And 
you are certain that you’re sitting here. You don’t 
have to be infallible to know those things any more 
than you have to be infallible to know that one 
and one make two, to know your name, address, 
and telephone number …. or to know God.  
The upshot of all this is that instead of letting 
the grand masters of the intellectual tradition sit 
on the top of Mt. Olympus and send down orders 
about what they will permit us to count as self-
evident, they should be quiet and let us tell them 
what we in fact experience to be self evident.  (If 
you think that last sentence was hyperbole, it’s 
wasn’t. Oxford philosopher Anthony Quentin, in 
his book Metaphysics, says that restrictions have to 
be put on self-evidency, or people will be telling 
us that their moral and religious beliefs are self 
evident.) The unmitigated arrogance of that! 
But is this idea of self-evidency really the same 
as the experience of conversion as described in the 
New Testament? To see that this is so, recall that 
experiencing a belief to be self-evident has long 
been described in visual metaphors by those who 
wrote about it. Philosophers, mathematicians, and 
logicians, etc., have spoken about “seeing” the 
truth or about being “enlightened,” for example. 
So I call your attention to the ways the New 
Testament speaks in these same visual metaphors 
about acquiring belief in God:  it speaks of the 
“eyes” of our “understanding” being opened, about 
the “light of the gospel” shining into “hearts that 
had been darkened.”  It speaks of the Holy Spirit 
as removing a person’s “blindness” so that he or 
she sees the gospel to be the truth about God from 
God. In these ways it clearly makes belief in God’s 
reality a result of experience: the experience of 
directly seeing it to be the truth. So I conclude 
that what has been called self-evidency in math 
and logic is the same sort of experience as what is 
called “enlightenment” in the New Testament.
Let me add, however, that putting our belief 
in God’s reality on this basis doesn’t mean we 
can never have doubts or misgivings about that 
experience. That happens with respect to truths of 
math and logic, and with respect to normal sense 
perceptions, and it can happen with respect to 
belief in God. Nor does saying that God is known 
because his reality is self-evident mean that we 
can’t sometimes feel far away from God. That is 
every believer’s experience. But it does mean that 
the basis upon which we claim to know God’s 
reality is the same as that upon which we know 
that one and one make two and that this address is 
now in progress.  
I’ll close by reading from two writers who saw 
all this clearly. The first is John Calvin, who puts 
it this way: 
As to the question “how shall we be persuaded 
that scripture came from God,” it’s just the 
same as if we were asked “how shall we learn 
to distinguish light from darkness, white from 
black, sweet from bitter?”  Scripture bears upon 
the face of it as clear evidence of its truth as do 
white and black of their color, sweet and bitter 
of their taste.” (Inst. 1.7.2)
Those who strive to build up firm faith 
in scripture by argument are doing things 
backward.  Even if anyone could clear God’s 
sacred word from man’s evil accusations, He will 
not at the same time imprint upon their hearts 
the certainty that piety requires. For unbelieving 
men, religion seems to stand by opinion alone. 
And so in order not to believe anything foolishly 
or lightly, they wish and demand rational proof 
that Moses and the prophets spoke by divine 
inspiration. But I reply that the testimony of 
the Spirit is more excellent than all reasoning.  
Scripture carrying its own evidence along with 
it deigns not to submit to proofs and arguments 
but owes the full conviction with which we 
ought to receive it to the testimony of the Spirit 
of God.” (Inst. 1.7.4)
Blaise Pascal takes the same position but phrases it 
another way: 
We know truth not only by reasoning but also 
by the heart,  and it is in this last way that we 
know first principles; and reason, which has no 
art in it, tries in vain to impugn them.… [For 
example] we know we do not [now] dream…
however impossible it is for us to prove it by 
reason…. The knowledge of first principles of 
space, time, motion and number is as sure as any 
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of those we can get by reasoning.  And reason 
must trust these intuitions of the heart and base 
every argument upon them.” (Pensees, trans. AJ 
Krailsheimer [London: Penguin, 1966], 58)
He then closes the same paragraph this way: 
[T]herefore those to whom God has imparted 
religion by intuition are fortunate, and justly 
convinced. (Remember, justified belief is 
knowledge.)
My conclusion, then, is that when we are asked 
“how do we know God’s real?” the right answer 
is that his existence is self-evident to us. And if 
someone else replies “Well, it’s not to me,” the 
answer to that is, “Right. And that’s why you don’t 
believe it. But there is a way you can find out if it 
is. You can try reading the Gospel of John and see 
if you find anything in it to be self-evident truth.” 
The rest is in God’s hands.
